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I examine whether audit committees (ACs) improve financial reporting reliability by utilizing an 
internal audit function (IAF) as a resource. By exploiting data in AC charters, I construct novel 
measures of how and the extent to which ACs utilize IAFs. I first document an improvement in 
financial reporting reliability (fewer restatements) for firms that introduce an IAF under a NYSE 
mandate. This reporting improvement is concentrated among firms with ACs that utilize the new 
IAF significantly. Next, using more precise, hand-coded measures of IAF utilization, I show that 
the value of the IAF as a resource to the AC increases when (1) the AC meets privately with the 
IAF to discuss the activities of the IAF and relevant internal audit findings and ensures open 
communication between them, (2) the AC promotes the independence of the IAF, and (3) AC 
members are stretched thin with multiple board positions. Finally, I document an economic benefit 





I study whether financial reporting reliability improves when audit committees (ACs) 
utilize internal audit functions (IAFs) as a resource in executing their financial statement oversight 
responsibilities. Given the important role ACs play in promoting financial disclosure quality in 
financial markets (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo 1991; Klein 2002), shareholders, debtholders, 
regulators, and other market participants have an interest in understanding the factors that 
determine AC effectiveness in monitoring management. Driven by data availability, prior research 
on AC effectiveness focuses on structural committee characteristics, including the size of the AC 
and its members’ expertise and independence (DeFond and Zhang 2014). While this research has 
yielded important insights, recent work suggests that these structural characteristics are not by 
themselves adequate to ensure monitoring quality (e.g., Kim and Klein 2017; Klein 2018). There 
remains much to learn about how actual AC activities and processes inform the quality of financial 
reporting oversight (Larcker and Tayan 2011). 
Governance professionals consider utilization of the IAF one of the most vital of AC 
activities (PwC 2016; KPMG 2017). Consistent with this, regulators have repeatedly proposed 
requirements that firms maintain IAFs that interface with ACs (SEC 2003b, 2013). While the SEC 
approved such a mandate for NYSE firms in 2003, a NASDAQ proposal received significant 
pushback from issuers and was withdrawn (SEC 2003b, 2013). Many constituents objected 
because of a perceived unfavorable cost-benefit trade-off (e.g., Driscoll 2015; Hill 2013). While 
the costs of utilizing an IAF can be estimated (e.g., Driscoll 2015), the benefits remain unclear to 
regulators and markets.1  
                                                     
1  The Institute of Internal Auditors provides customized aggregated benchmarking data including information on IAF 
costs through its Audit Intelligence Suite. Also, in 2015 survey results, the American Productivity and Quality Center 
reported median internal control process costs (which encompass IAF costs) of $0.73 for every $1,000 in revenue 
(APQC 2015).  
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I propose that AC utilization of the IAF may be especially important for financial reporting 
reliability because such a process can mitigate limitations that the AC suffers otherwise.2 In 
particular, while AC independence as mandated (SEC 2003a) improves the quality of AC oversight 
in some ways (e.g., Klein 2002), it can restrict committee members’ familiarity with the processes 
that inform the financial statements. Furthermore, AC members are limited in the attention they 
can devote to understanding and monitoring any accounting or reporting process (Ernst & Young 
2014; IIA 2016). For these reasons, the AC necessarily relies on a source of inside information in 
order to provide informed oversight over financial reporting (DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault, 
and Reed 2002; Hill 2013). Among the potential sources of such information (including 
management, internal auditors, and external auditors), the IAF stands out as advantageously 
positioned to provide information that reflects both inside expertise and objectivity (PwC 2017).3 
By utilizing the IAF, the AC gains access to this important information. Based on these arguments, 
I hypothesize that financial reporting reliability improves with the extent to which the AC utilizes 
the IAF as a resource.4  
Alternatively, if the AC can obtain the information it needs to properly monitor financial 
reporting from other sources (including management and external auditors), then utilizing the IAF 
as an information resource may not have an impact. Furthermore, I expect the benefits of utilizing 
                                                     
2 ACs can utilize multiple resources when overseeing financial reporting. As examples, an AC might utilize reports 
from external auditors regarding audit procedures performed, discussions with accounting managers about significant 
accounting treatments, or reviews from the IAF on the status of internal controls throughout the firm. 
3 As part of its ‘mandatory guidance’, The Institute of Internal Auditors lists objectivity and freedom from undue 
influence as a Core Principle for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (IIA 2017). The majority of IAFs report 
directly to the AC as a way to improve independence from management (Christ, Masli, Sharp, and Wood 2015). 
Several studies address the importance of IAF objectivity, including Christ et al. (2015) and Abbott, Daugherty, Parker 
and Peters (2016). 
4 The IAF also stands to gain from strong AC-IAF relations. To be effective monitors of financial reporting and internal 
controls, the IAF relies on a source of authority vis-à-vis management. The AC can endow the IAF with the authority 
it needs in order to see reporting fixes and improvements through to implementation. Anecdotally, 11 internal auditors 




the IAF to vary in the following cross-sections. First, since internal auditors can sometimes feel 
uncomfortable conveying sensitive information to the AC (Chambers 2015), I expect important 
reporting issues to be raised and addressed more readily when the AC creates an atmosphere of 
free communication in which internal auditors feel comfortable reporting all findings to the AC. 
Second, the quality of the information provided to the AC by the IAF may improve if the AC 
works to promote the independence of the internal auditors, because undue influence from 
management can compromise IAF objectivity. Third, AC members with ample time to dedicate to 
their own monitoring activities may benefit relatively less from information provided by the IAF 
as compared to very busy AC members who rely more heavily on the IAF. 
I use AC charters to measure the extent to which ACs utilize the IAF as a resource. Between 
2000 and 2006, publicly-traded firms were required by the SEC to include their AC charter in their 
proxy filing at least once every three years (SEC 2000, 2006), allowing me to gather a 
comprehensive sample of more than 10,000 AC charters. These charters describe the AC’s 
authority and responsibilities and exhibit significant variation in whether and to what extent they 
discuss the AC’s interaction with the IAF.5 With this data, I identify companies with ACs that do 
(or do not) utilize an IAF and measure the extent of IAF utilization.  
To examine whether AC utilization of an IAF impacts financial reporting reliability, I 
exploit an exogenous mandate to implement an IAF. In 2003, the SEC approved a rule proposed 
by the NYSE to require that all NYSE-listed firms create and maintain an IAF by 2004. Using a 
difference-in-differences design, I examine changes in the likelihood of a restatement around this 
rule change for firms that maintained an IAF through my entire sample period (early adopters), 
                                                     
5 It is the AC’s responsibility to adopt a charter and to review it on an annual basis. The charter and any changes 




versus firms with AC charters that first mention the IAF after the rule change in 2004 (compliers). 
I find that relative to early adopters, compliers exhibit a significantly greater decrease in the 
likelihood of a restatement after the rule change. Importantly, I also find that this improvement in 
reporting reliability is driven not by the presence of a new IAF alone, but also by significant AC 
utilization of the new IAF. To mitigate the effects of differences in observable attributes in these 
tests, I weight my sample using entropy balancing and find even stronger results.6 
Next, to capture the nuance in how ACs utilize IAFs and examine whether certain kinds of 
interactions matter more, I manually read a random sample of over 1,000 charters and code each 
IAF reference individually (see Appendix B). This allows me to identify ACs that specifically state 
their duty to meet regularly with the IAF, to consult with the IAF regarding significant accounting 
matters, to review the scope and results of IAF audits, to ensure IAF independence and authority, 
and to interact with the IAF in numerous other ways. I use this rich data to further explore how 
ACs can improve their monitoring by utilizing the IAF. In particular, I find that financial reporting 
reliability is greater when ACs meet regularly in private session with the IAF to review the scope 
of their work and their audit findings and recommendations. Consistent with my expectations, this 
association strengthens when (1) the AC commits to promoting free and open communication with 
the IAF, which encourages the flow of sensitive information, (2) the AC preserves the value of the 
IAF as an informational resource by promoting IAF independence from management, and (3) AC 
members are very busy with multiple other board positions and thus rely more heavily on input 
from the IAF. 
                                                     
6 My approach is akin to that of Lennox (2016), who examines the effect of a PCAOB regulation effective in 2005. 
Lennox (2016) identifies treatment firms as those that needed to comply with the regulation and control firms as early 
adopters for which the rule had little effect. He shows that his results are robust to running difference-in-differences 
tests on an unmatched sample as well as a propensity score-matched sample (effectively weighting observations at 0 
or 1). I follow this approach, except that I entropy balance observations (using continuous weights), which allows 
covariate balance while retaining all observations to maximize statistical power.  
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I take further advantage of my data and setting to investigate whether utilizing the IAF has 
economic implications. Consistent with prior research that establishes a negative association 
between accounting/audit quality and the cost of capital, I predict that financing costs decrease 
when the AC utilizes the IAF.7  I focus here on private lenders because they are the most significant 
source of capital for firms (e.g., Arena 2011) and have significant incentive and ability to monitor 
management and the reporting process. To examine this question, I merge my AC charter database 
with terms of private loan agreements from DealScan. I find that utilizing the IAF is associated 
with lower borrowing costs. For example, firms with AC charters describing at least some 
utilization of the IAF have loan spreads that are 31 basis points lower than firms that describe no 
IAF utilization. Furthermore, conditional on the AC having access to an IAF, the extent of IAF 
utilization is also negatively associated with loan spreads. I interpret these results as evidence that 
lenders perceive the benefits of ACs utilizing the IAF, resulting in cost savings to firms placing 
private debt.8  
This study contributes to the AC literature by highlighting the IAF as an important resource 
to the AC in discharging its duty to promote internal control and reporting integrity (PwC 2016). 
While numerous studies have examined the role of independence and expertise in determining AC 
effectiveness (e.g., Klein 2002; Abbott, Parker, and Peters 2004; Krishnan 2005; Cohen et al. 
2014), little is known about the influence of other important factors, like board processes (DeFond 
and Zhang 2014; Larcker and Tayan 2011). I highlight AC utilization of the IAF as an important 
board process with significant implications for monitoring quality.  
                                                     
7 See for example Aobdia, Lin, and Petacchi (2015), Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder (2008), Francis, LaFond, Olsson, 
and Schipper (2005) and Minnis (2011). 
8 I also examine changes in loan spreads around the NYSE internal audit mandate, finding that firms that adopted an 
IAF at the time of the mandate experienced a decrease in loan spreads at that time relative to firms that had been 
utilizing an IAF all along. See a description of these tests and results in Section IV. 
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I also contribute to the IAF literature in several ways (e.g., Prawitt, Smith, and Wood 2009; 
Abbott et al. 2016; Christ et al. 2015; Lin, Pizzini, Vargus, and Bardhan 2011; Ege 2015). First, 
my study informs the debate regarding the value of implementing an IAF by quantifying important 
financial reporting and economic implications of the NYSE mandate. I am the first to document 
benefits that arise when regulators require IAFs and when ACs utilize the IAF as a resource. 
Second, I provide evidence that IAF effectiveness is determined not only by direct IAF 
characteristics (like IAF budgets and internal auditor quality) but also by AC-IAF relations. My 
results suggest the AC plays a role in fostering the effectiveness of the IAF. Third, the dataset and 
measures introduced in this study are unique and can complement extant IAF studies which rely 
heavily on small-sample survey data (by mitigating limitations related to response bias, statistical 
power, and generalizability).  
The findings of this paper should be of interest to regulators considering IAF mandates but 
with incomplete information as to the implications for financial reporting, to board members 
working to enhance audit committee effectiveness, and to managers struggling to gauge whether 
the benefits of implementing an IAF outweigh the costs. My evidence suggests that mandating 
IAF adoption and utilizing the IAF as a resource to the AC improve the reliability of financial 
reporting and lower debt contracting costs.  
II. Background and Hypothesis Development 
Audit Committees  
Academic literature commonly discusses AC effectiveness in terms of a framework that 
includes the committee’s (1) composition, including independence and expertise, (2) authority, (3) 
diligence, and (4) resources (Cohen, Hoitash, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright 2014; DeZoort et al. 
2002). In general, there is broad-based evidence that AC independence and expertise are associated 
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with many different control, audit, and reporting outcomes (e.g., Klein 2002; Abbott, Parker, and 
Peters 2004; Krishnan 2005; Cohen et al. 2014).9 Despite the difficulty in measuring AC authority 
and diligence, some studies have shown that these dimensions also affect financial reporting 
quality (e.g., Badolato, Donelson, and Ege 2014; Ashraf, Choudhary, and Jaggi 2020; Bratten, 
Causholli, and Sulcaj 2019).10  
My study relates closely to the resources component of AC effectiveness. AC resources 
include an adequate number of committee members, as well as access to management, external 
auditors, and internal auditors (DeZoort et al. 2002). Prior studies address the effects of committee 
size, with weak results.11 Furthermore, studies examining AC access to auditors and other 
resources are rare, largely due to data limitations. In this study, I focus on ACs’ utilization of the 
IAF as a critical element of the resources component of AC effectiveness. Current AC guidance 
literature asserts the IAF’s position as a vital resource to the AC. For example, PwC (2016, 8) 
states that the IAF can be an advisor in helping the AC meet its objectives, calling the IAF “a 
critical factor in the audit committee’s effective oversight.” KPMG (2017, 61) asserts the same 
sentiment, saying, “Internal audit is likely to be the single most significant resource used by the 
audit committee in helping the governing body to discharge its responsibilities.” I seek to examine 
how the AC can improve reporting reliability by utilizing the IAF as a resource. 
Internal Audit Functions 
In recent years, practitioners and regulators have sharpened their focus on internal audit 
functions as a vital component of corporate governance (e.g., AICPA 2008; IIA 2017; NYSE 
                                                     
9 More recent work questions whether fundamental AC requirements (like independence) produce their intended 
effects. For example, Kim and Klein (2017) find no significant responses in financial reporting quality measures 
around the 1999 rule change to require 100% independent ACs, and no evidence that investors valued the change.   
10 For reviews of the AC literature, see Bédard and Gendron (2010) and DeFond and Zhang (2014). 
11 For example, Badolato et al. (2014) find no relation between AC size and financial irregularities. Similarly, 




2018). Academic researchers have followed suit as an expanding literature has examined the 
importance of IAFs to internal controls and financial reporting. For example, Prawitt et al. (2009) 
find a negative relation between IAF quality and certain measures of earnings management. Lin et 
al. (2011) find that internal control weakness disclosures vary with IAF attributes. Ege (2015) 
provides evidence that management misconduct is reduced when IAF quality is high. This 
literature has often modeled IAF quality as a function of direct IAF characteristics like auditor 
certifications, experience, training, budget size, and reporting lines.  
Researchers acknowledge that despite the intuition that IAFs should positively impact 
controls and financial reporting quality, such research is still relatively new and the overall 
empirical evidence is not strong (Abbott et al. 2016; DeFond and Zhang 2014). This may be partly 
because IAF influence and effectiveness are likely determined by numerous inputs, only some of 
which are captured by the direct IAF characteristics discussed above. In my study, I exploit 
variation in the degree to which the AC and the IAF work together, asserting that this is an input 
to IAF quality that prior literature has not adequately addressed.  
Audit Committee and Internal Audit Function Relations 
Prior small-sample studies find a relationship between certain AC characteristics and the 
degree of IAF interaction with the AC (in determinants-type tests). For example, ACs that are more 
independent and have more accounting expertise are more likely to meet with the IAF, hold longer 
meetings with the IAF, and review the results of the IAF program (e.g. Raghunandan, Rama, and 
Read 2001; Goodwin and Yeo 2001; Goodwin 2003).  
Some studies use IAF reporting relationships to measure IAF independence, because IAFs 
that report directly to the AC should be more independent from management (e.g., Prawitt et al. 
2009; Christ et al. 2015; Ege 2015). Abbott et al. (2016) use finer data from a survey of 189 internal 
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auditors to measure IAF independence (accumulating responses regarding the amount of influence 
exerted by the AC versus management on [1] IAF reporting lines, [2] the authority to terminate 
the chief internal auditor, and [3] determination of the IAF budget). The authors report that 
discretionary accruals are lower when IAF competence and independence coexist. My study 
complements Abbott et al. (2016) and differs in important ways. Whereas Abbott et al. (2016) 
examine IAF independence, I examine how and the extent to which the AC utilizes the IAF as a 
resource. Moreover, by examining restatements instead of accruals, I provide evidence on whether 
utilizing the IAF can reduce material misreporting. 
I focus on the IAF as an AC resource for several reasons. First, I argue that among the 
potential information resources an AC could utilize, the IAF is most advantageously positioned to 
provide objective inside information. Second, while much of the AC’s interaction with the external 
auditor is imposed by Congress, auditing standards, and stock exchanges (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, SAS 61, SR-NYSE-2002-33, SR-NASD-99-48) and so exhibits limited variation 
across firms, the extent of the AC’s utilization of the IAF remains largely discretionary and exhibits 
significant variation. Third, while the visibility and perceived importance of the IAF has risen over 
time (Abbott et al. 2016; Morgan 2016), many firms (and ACs) still choose not to utilize an IAF 
and empirical evidence regarding the IAF’s impact on reporting quality is limited (Abbott et al. 
2016).  
Hypotheses 
The financial reporting impact of utilizing the IAF as a resource to the AC 
I hypothesize that AC monitoring of financial reporting can be improved when the AC 
utilizes the IAF because the respective strengths and weaknesses of these two entities complement 
each other. AC members hold authority, broad expertise, and a high-level perspective of reporting 
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processes, goals, and events. Yet, because ACs are independent of financial management, 
distanced from day-to-day financial reporting processes, and limited in the detailed attention they 
can afford any individual accounting or reporting process, they are not optimally positioned to 
identify errors and irregularities. For this, they necessarily rely on management as well as internal 
and external auditors. The IAF may be the most important source of objective inside information 
by virtue of their professional commitment to objectivity (IIA 2017) combined with day-to-day 
exposure to accounting processes and personnel at all levels of the firm. Indeed, effective IAFs 
can be viewed by committee members as their “eyes and ears”, with access to the organization that 
puts them in a unique position to be a valued resource to the AC, as objective insiders (Gramling, 
Maletta, Schneider, and Church 2004; PwC 2016). For example, an AC chairperson I interviewed 
stated the following in reference to the committee’s reliance on the IAF for internal control 
information: 
“And of course, the internal auditors are always doing all of their work. We get all their 
reports and summaries of trends in internal controls by business unit, by function, by 
location… who’s been naughty, who’s been nice.” 
 
 When the IAF informs the AC with objective inside information, I expect financial 
reporting benefits, because through such activity accounting issues can be identified, raised and 
addressed more readily throughout a reporting period, decreasing the likelihood of material errors 
in periodic financial reports.  
However, if the AC can obtain the information it needs to properly monitor financial 
reporting from other sources, then utilizing the IAF as an information resource may not have an 
impact. For example, ACs may not benefit incrementally from utilizing the IAF if the AC is able 
to gather a mix of inside information from management and objective information from the 
external auditors. Consistent with this, some ACs (which quite often are populated with retired 
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partners of public accounting firms) feel that the information provided by the IAF is not as valuable 
as what they receive from the external auditors (Chambers 2017). If this is true, I may not observe 
any on-average association between utilization of the IAF and reporting reliability. I state my 
formal hypothesis in the alternative form as follows: 
H1:  AC utilization of the IAF is associated with improved financial reporting reliability. 
 
I expect the association between AC utilization of the IAF and reporting reliability, if any, 
to vary with (1) the openness of communication between the IAF and AC, (2) the independence 
and authority of the IAF, and (3) the ‘busyness’ of the AC. I address these three possibilities in the 
hypotheses and analyses that follow.  
The openness of communication  
 If benefits of utilizing the IAF as a resource to the AC occur because of the flow of 
meaningful (and potentially sensitive) information about accounting processes, internal controls, 
and management lapses, then the value of the IAF as a resource depends on the willingness of 
internal auditors to share that information. However, some internal auditors and AC members shy 
away from uncomfortable or sensitive discussions (Chambers 2015). Furthermore, management 
may feel uncomfortable with an IAF that provides an independent perspective on management’s 
effectiveness (Chambers 2017). Since most IAFs ‘serve two masters’ (needing to satisfy 
management as well as the AC), internal auditors may be reluctant to provide important 
information to the AC if it reflects negatively on management.12 Thus, if the AC fails to create an 
atmosphere of free communication in which internal auditors feel comfortable reporting all 
                                                     
12 Anecdotally, of 11 internal auditors I surveyed in 2019, 5 (45%) did not agree with the statement that they “feel 
more comfortable raising important issues to the audit committee than to management.” Also, 4 respondents (36%) 
did not agree with the statement that they “are comfortable reporting management lapses to the audit committee.” 
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findings to the AC, important reporting issues identified by the IAF will go unaddressed, resulting 
in lower financial reporting reliability. I state my second hypothesis in the alternative form:  
H2:  The financial reporting reliability benefits of utilizing the IAF as a resource to the AC 
increase with the openness of communication between the AC and IAF. 
 
The independence and authority of the IAF 
Auditing literature has long modeled external audit quality as a function of auditor 
independence from management (e.g. DeAngelo 1981). I follow Abbott et al. (2016) in applying 
this theoretical framework to internal auditors, and hypothesize that the value of the IAF as a 
resource to the AC hinges on the objectivity of the information internal auditors provide. Though 
internal auditors are not independent by regulation nor as independent as external auditors, they 
do uphold professional standards of objectivity (IIA 2017). The more resistant the internal auditor 
to management pressure, the greater the likelihood that IAF findings related to internal controls 
and financial reporting will be reported to the AC objectively and addressed.  
In contrast to the AC, the IAF’s duties include not only the monitoring of financial 
reporting and internal controls but also working with management to improve operational 
efficiencies. The IAF can be effective in its operational roles with support from management only, 
because incentives in this case are aligned. In the case of financial reporting, though, incentives of 
management may diverge from those of shareholders. Monitoring by the IAF can reduce 
associated agency costs, but only when the IAF is supported by the AC, because without such 
support IAF recommendations will be implemented at management’s discretion. The AC can 
empower the IAF with authority, helping to enact improvements that the IAF on its own could not 
accomplish. For example, one IAF director states: “If the [audit] committee could articulate the 
importance of internal audit, that would elevate our role and importance” (PwC 2011). 
20 
 
In summary, I expect that financial reporting problems can be mitigated when the AC utilizes 
the IAF as a resource and also acts to protect the IAF’s independence and promote their authority 
in the organization. By so doing, the AC can protect the quality of their resource - the information 
provided through utilizing the IAF.  
However, prior literature provides some tension to these arguments. Norman, Rose, and 
Rose (2010) find in an experimental setting that internal auditors perceive greater personal threat 
when reporting high levels of risk directly to the AC as opposed to management. Because of this, 
internal auditors in their experiment reported lower levels of risk when reporting directly to the 
AC. If internal auditors experience heightened threat levels when the AC strengthens the 
independence of the IAF (to promote IAF reporting to the AC), then information flow may be 
hampered, reducing or eliminating the reporting reliability benefits. I state my third hypothesis in 
the alternative form: 
H3:  The financial reporting reliability benefits of utilizing the IAF as a resource to the AC 
increase when the AC promotes the objectivity and authority of the IAF. 
 
The ‘busyness’ of the AC 
Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007) define corporate governance as “the set of 
mechanisms that influence the decisions made by managers when there is a separation of 
ownership and control” (pg. 964). Multiple entities monitor management in order to foster 
corporate decision-making in the interests of owners and to mitigate misreporting. In general, the 
more monitoring that exists, the less misreporting can occur, but when two monitors undertake 
redundant monitoring efforts, managerial misreporting is limited no further than if just one monitor 
existed – the second monitor’s efforts are wasted (Pagano and Röell 1998). 
Thus, the intensity of monitoring over financial reporting that is provided by the AC to begin 
with may provide one source of variation in the benefits of utilizing the IAF as a resource. In one 
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extreme, AC members devote so much time and attention themselves in monitoring financial 
reporting that they have no need for information provided by the IAF. In the other extreme, AC 
members are so busy or distracted (with other committee or board appointments, full-time jobs or 
other responsibilities), that they monitor management very little themselves. In the second case, 
relying on information provided by the IAF can achieve marginal disciplining of management that 
benefits reporting reliability. Thus, I expect the financial reporting reliability benefits of utilizing 
the IAF as a resource to the AC to occur most readily when ACs are busier and rely more heavily 
on monitoring provided by the IAF. I state my final hypothesis in the alternative form:  
H4:  The financial reporting reliability benefits of utilizing the IAF as a resource to the AC 
increase with the busyness of the AC. 
 
III. Research Design 
Measurement of IAF-Related Variables 
I rely on AC charters to measure AC utilization of the IAF. These charters describe ACs’ 
powers and responsibilities and are a required disclosure of all publicly-traded companies (SEC 
2000). Charters serve as an instrument for establishing the AC’s mandate and for helping 
stakeholders assess its activities (e.g., DeZoort et al. 2002; Kalbers and Fogarty 1993). The SEC 
states that the AC charter should be tailored to each company’s specific circumstances (SEC 2000). 
Anecdotally, three AC chairs I interviewed confirmed without exception that they are careful to 
carry out every duty listed in their charter. Thus, I consider the AC charter a useful proxy for actual 
AC responsibilities and activities (Ashraf et al. 2020).  
To measure the extent of IAF utilization by the AC, I first count the number of times the AC 
charter references the phrase “internal audit” (called IA_COUNT, or LOG_IACOUNT when 
logged). This variable exhibits significant variation. While approximately 22 percent of charters 
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include no mention of an IAF, the median value of IA_COUNT is five.13 To separate observations 
with no reference to the IAF from those with one or more, I create IA_INDICATOR, set equal to 
one if IA_COUNT is greater than or equal to one, and zero otherwise. To study the effects of high 
levels of AC utilization of the IAF, I define an additional indicator variable, HIGH_IACOUNT, 
which is equal to one if IA_COUNT for a firm-year observation is at or above the sample median 
and zero otherwise.  
NYSE Setting 
In 2002 the NYSE proposed a rule to require that all NYSE-listed firms maintain an IAF. 
This proposal was published in 2002, approved by the SEC in 2003, and made effective as of 2004 
(SEC 2003b). I use AC charters in context of this setting to identify two key groups of firms: 
compliers and early adopters. Compliers are NYSE firms that do not have an IAF prior to the 
NYSE mandate and so must implement a new IAF when the mandate becomes effective. 
Operationally, I identify compliers as those NYSE firms with AC charters that make no reference 
to an IAF prior to the mandate (IA_INDICATOR = 0) but make at least one IAF reference in the 
post-mandate period (IA_INDICATOR = 1). The complier firms form my treatment group. 
Specifically, for all observations of complier firms, I set the dummy variable TREAT equal to one.  
Early adopters are firms that maintain an IAF throughout the entire sample period (both 
before and after the mandate). I identify early adopters as those NYSE firms with AC charters that 
make at least one reference to the IAF (IA_INDICATOR = 1) in the periods both before and after 
the regulation. I assume that these firms maintained an IAF that the AC utilized in some form prior 
to the NYSE rule implementation. Early adopters form my control group, meaning that for all 
observations of these firms, TREAT is equal to zero. Figure 1 illustrates the trend in 
                                                     
13 These figures are based on the full sample of 10,165 charters I gather, and so do not correspond exactly to descriptive 
statistics in Table 2 (which are based on the final sample of NYSE firms used to test H1).  
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IA_INDICATOR over my sample period. Approximately 80 percent of AC charters of NYSE firms 
reference an IAF at the beginning of my sample period. This percentage increases concurrently 
with the announcement and approval of the IAF mandate (in 2002 and 2003). By 2004 (the 
effective date of the mandate), nearly 100 percent of NYSE firms reference an IAF in their AC 
charter.14 By comparison, approximately 70-80 percent of non-NYSE firms reference an IAF in 
their charters.  
Sample Selection 
While AC charters are publicly available, no accessible database of charters exists. However, 
from 2000-2006 firms were required to include a copy of their charter in their proxy statement 
filing at least once every three years (SEC 2000, 2006).15 Consequently, in order to build a 
repository of charters, I first identify the complete set of proxy filings on the SEC EDGAR archives 
between 2000 and 2006. I then manually access each filing, ascertain whether the filing includes 
a copy of the AC charter and if so, save the charter contents into a text file that can be linked to 
the issuing firm and year. The process yields 10,165 charter observations from 2000 to 2006.16 I 
merge these charter data with Compustat such that year of the AC charter filing matches the fiscal 
year of the firm’s financial data. After merging further with BoardEx, Audit Analytics, and 
Thomson Reuters databases, the resulting dataset is an intermittent time series of charter data 
(because firms were not required to include a copy of their charter each year) appended with 
financial, audit, and governance variables. 
                                                     
14 In the post-mandate period, more than 98 percent of NYSE firms reference an IAF in their AC charter. Firms that 
do not comply with the mandate are removed from the sample. 
15 Effective November 2006, the requirement to include the charter in proxy statements was superseded by a rule 
designed to reduce the length of proxy statements and the potential for information overload. This rule allows firms 
to post their charter on their company website and simply refer to it in their proxy statement. As such, my sample 
period ends in 2006. 
16 I thank Musaib Ashraf and Preeti Choudhary for their assistance in gathering AC charters. The base sample of AC 
charters I use is the same as that used in Ashraf et al. (2020). 
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Table 1, Panel A provides a breakdown of my sample selection. Of the 10,165 charter 
observations in my base sample, I successfully merge 6,377 with Compustat, Thomson-Reuters, 
BoardEx, and Audit Analytics. To create the sample for the tests using the setting of the NYSE 
internal audit mandate (called ‘NYSE sample’), I keep all NYSE observations with a charter, while 
removing all non-NYSE observations. I limit the sample to NYSE firms for difference-in-
differences tests because the IAF mandate only applies to them. By limiting the sample, I estimate 
the within-exchange effect of the mandate. 
To eliminate the possibility that a complier firm instituting an IAF in 2002 or 2003 in 
response to the NYSE proposal or the SEC ruling (that occurred during this time period) is 
inaccurately identified as an early adopter, I exclude all 2002 and 2003 observations from the 
sample.17 After requiring data to compute the variables in my models, the final ‘NYSE sample’ 
used in difference-in-differences tests consists of 2,046 firm year observations. 
Descriptive statistics for the NYSE sample are reported in Table 2, Panel A. The median 
number of references to the IAF in AC charters is eight. Eighteen percent of firm years in this 
sample are subsequently restated. On average, ACs have just over four members and meet seven 
times per year. Sixty-six percent of ACs have at least one member who qualifies as an accounting 
financial expert. These descriptives are in line with prior AC research (e.g., Badolato et al. 2014; 
Carcello, Hollingsworth, Klein, and Neal 2006; Dhaliwal, Naiker, and Navissi 2010; Krishnan and 
Visvanathan 2008). I report Pearson correlations in Panel B of Table 2. TREAT (i.e. observations 
of firms that waited until the mandate to adopt an IAF) is negatively correlated with the size, 
expertise, and independence of the AC and board of directors. There is no significant univariate 
                                                     
17 This design choice is a trade-off, as dropping these years reduces measurement error in TREAT but also reduces 
sample size and power. Results are robust to only excluding 2003 observations, and to excluding no observations. 
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correlation between RESTATEMENT and TREAT (or POST). I explore these relations further in 
the multivariate analysis described in Section IV. 
Model Description 
I use a difference-in-differences design to test Hypothesis 1, modeling the change in the   
likelihood of a restatement between treatment and control groups when progressing from before 
the NYSE internal audit mandate to after. Formally stated, I estimate the following equation: 
  
RESTATEMENTit= 𝛼0 + β1TREATi + β2POSTt + β3TREATi ∗POSTt +∑βnControlsit + 𝜀it                (1) 
 
In this equation, RESTATEMENTit is an indicator variable equal to one if the financial statements 
for firm i in year t were subsequently restated, and zero otherwise.18,19 TREATi is an indicator 
variable equal to one for all observations of complier firms of the NYSE internal audit mandate 
and zero for all observations of early adopter firms, as described previously. POSTt is an indicator 
variable equal to one for the years 2004-2006 (the effective period of the NYSE mandate) and zero 
for the years 2000-2001. As the difference-in-differences estimator, the coefficient on the 
interaction term TREATi*POSTt (β3) represents the difference between (a) the change in 
restatement likelihood for treatment firms from before to after the NYSE internal audit mandate, 
i.e., those firms that implemented an IAF in response to the rule and (b) the corresponding change 
in restatement likelihood for control firms, which maintained an IAF all along. In this way, I 
                                                     
18 Since RESTATEMENT is a binary variable, I use a logistic model. To ensure my results are not driven by this design 
choice, I run all restatement analyses using a linear probability model as well. Results are consistent (un-tabulated but 
available upon request). 
19 I do not distinguish between material (Item 4.02 Non-Reliance) and immaterial restatements. RESTATEMENT 
equals one if either occurs. Since Item 4.02 restatements only occur beginning in 2004, I cannot examine them in the 
setting of the NYSE internal audit mandate.  
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compare firms that implement an IAF only when it was mandated to firms that did so before the 
mandate existed.20 
I include in equation (1) three sets of control variables. First, to control for AC and other 
governance characteristics, I include the following variables (refer to Appendix A for variable 
definitions): the number of meetings the AC holds during the year (AC_MEETINGS), accounting 
expertise of AC members (AC_EXPERTISE), the number of AC members (AC_SIZE), the number 
of members of the board at-large (BOARD_SIZE), the independence of the board 
(BOARD_INDEP), the tenure of independent board members (INDEP_DIR_TENURE), duality of 
CEO responsibility (CEO_CHAIR), the busyness of the board (BUSY_BOARD), and institutional 
ownership of the firm (INST_OWNERSHIP and INST_BLOCKHOLDERS).  
Second, I control for the following audit and auditor characteristics: internal control 
weaknesses (MATERIAL_WEAKNESS), modified audit opinions (MODOP), AUDITORTENURE, 
AUDITOREXPERTISE, AUDITFEES, NONAUDITFEES, and BIGN.  Third, I include measures 
of firm characteristics, including MTB, FIRMAGE, SIZE, FOREIGN, BUS_SEGMENTS, 
ISSUANCE, LEVERAGE, ROA, LOSS, ACQUISITION, RESTRUCTURE, INVENTORY, and 
ZSCORE.21 Finally, I include industry fixed effects (based on 2-digit SIC codes). 
IV. Results 
Tests Using the NYSE Setting 
                                                     
20 An alternative design would be to compare NYSE treatment firms to a set of control firms that never implement an 
IAF. However, there are close to zero NYSE firms that never implement an IAF. Moreover, if I were to use NASDAQ 
firms with no IAF as a control sample, my treatment variable would be perfectly collinear with stock exchange, 
confounding any interpretation of TREAT.  
21 To ensure my results are not biased because of “over-controlling”, I also estimate a parsimonious version of 
Equation (1) in line with the model of Badolato et al. (2014), controlling only for AC expertise, AC size, board size, 
board independence, CEO duality, institutional ownership, firm size, MTB, leverage, issuance and ROA. Results are 
consistent.   
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My first hypothesis predicts that financial reporting reliability improves when the AC 
utilizes the IAF. I begin exploring this hypothesis by visualizing the reporting reliability effects of 
the NYSE internal audit mandate. Figure 2 depicts the time trend of RESTATEMENT for compliers 
(TREAT = 1) separately from early adopters (TREAT = 0) from 1996 to 2010. Prior to the NYSE 
rule change (effective 2004), trends in restatements are parallel but higher for compliers (this 
difference is statistically significant in 1997, 2001, 2002, and 2004).22 At the time of the rule 
change, compliers exhibit a steeper decline in restatement likelihood. Post-2004, the trends are no 
longer significantly different from each other. 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the results of estimating Equation (1). In column 1, the 
coefficient on TREAT (β1) is significantly positive (p = 0.070, marginal effect = 0.061), suggesting 
that in the pre-period, complier firms (those with no IAF) are more likely to issue material 
misstatements than firms with an IAF. The difference-in-differences estimator (β3) is significantly 
negative (p = 0.027, marginal effect = -0.083). Thus, consistent with the graphic representation in 
Figure 2, complier firms exhibit a significantly steeper decline in restatement likelihood relative 
to early adopters. In the post-period, there is no significant difference between restatement 
likelihood of compliers and that of early adopters (β1 + β3 is insignificant). In combination, this 
evidence suggests that financial reporting reliability was poorer for firms without an IAF prior to 
the NYSE mandate and that implementing an IAF to comply with the mandate brought financial 
reporting reliability in line with that of firms that had been utilizing an IAF all along. 
                                                     
22 To test the parallel trends assumption, I estimate the following logistic regression using the pre-regulation window 
only (e.g. Lennox 2016): RESTATEMENTit = β0 + β1TRENDt + β2TREATi + β3TRENDt*TREATi + εit. In this model, 
RESTATEMENTit and TREATi are as defined previously, while TRENDt is a count of the number of days from 1/1/2000 
to the effective date of the NYSE IAF mandate (10/31/2004). Consistent with parallel trends, the β3 coefficient is 
insignificantly different from zero (i.e., there is no significant difference in the trends in restatements between the 
treatment and control samples in the pre-regulation period). 
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To mitigate the possibility that differences in characteristics between the treatment and 
control groups (other than the IAF variables I analyze) may drive my results, I follow Lennox 
(2016) in weighting observations to minimize differences in observable characteristics.23 In 
particular, I entropy-balance my sample such that the means of all control variables are equal. 
Using this balanced sample, I obtain similar results (as reported in column 2).24 The evidence 
presented in Panel A of Table 3 can be interpreted in two ways. Consistent with my hypothesis, 
the observed financial reporting reliability improvement may arise because ACs have access to 
and utilize a new IAF, which improves the quality of their monitoring. Alternatively, firms that 
adopt an IAF may experience greater reporting reliability simply due to the stand-alone monitoring 
efforts of the new IAF (and not necessarily due to AC utilization of the IAF). I take the following 
additional steps to distinguish between these two possibilities. 
If AC utilization of the IAF improves reporting reliability, I expect the reduction in 
restatements among complier firms to be strongest when the AC discusses significant utilization 
of the new IAF in AC charters in the post-regulation period. To test this, I estimate versions of 
Equation (1) having replaced the treatment variable with HIGH_TREATi, which is equal to one for 
all observations for firms that make no mention of the IAF in their AC charter before the NYSE 
rule change in 2004 but are above the median number of IAF references in the AC charter after 
the rule change. I report results using this alternative treatment in Panel B of Table 3. Using both 
balanced and unbalanced samples, I continue to observe significant interaction terms (γ3), but with 
                                                     
23 I follow Lennox (2016) in weighting my sample, but take a different approach. While Lennox (2016) uses propensity 
score matching to match each treatment observation to a control observation (effectively weighting observations at 
one or zero to attain covariate balance), I use entropy balancing, which weights observations using a continuous 
weighting scheme to achieve covariate balance. One major advantage of this approach in my setting is that it does not 
reduce the sample like PSM and other matching techniques.  
24 Difference-in-differences results are robust to entropy balancing the mean, variances, and skewness of covariates. 
While this procedure matches effectively on observable characteristics, it does not rule out the possibility that 
unobservable differences between the treatment and control groups drive my results. 
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marginal effects roughly four times larger than those in Panel A (i.e., -0.086 versus -0.022). 
Furthermore, the total effects (γ1 + γ3) are now significantly negative. These results suggest that 
more significant AC utilization of a new IAF results in more significant financial reporting 
reliability improvements and rule out the possibility that IAF adoption alone drives the results in 
Panel A.  
To quantify the financial reporting reliability improvement for complier firms with ACs that 
interact considerably with the new IAF separately from any improvement for complier firms with 
ACs that interact minimally with the new IAF (and to ascertain whether the difference is 
statistically significant), I implement a triple interaction model based on Equation (1). Specifically, 
I introduce the variable HIGH_IACOUNT to the equation, as follows:   
RESTATEMENTit= δ0 + δ1TREATi + δ2POSTt + δ3HIGH_IACOUNTit + δ4TREATi∗POSTt        (2) 
+ δ5POSTt*HIGH_IACOUNTit + δ6TREATi*POSTt*HIGH_IACOUNTit + ∑βnControlsit + 𝜀it  
 
In this equation, RESTATEMENTit, TREATi, POSTt and all control variables are as previously 
defined, following Equation (1).25 HIGH_IACOUNTit is an indicator variable equal to one for 
charter observations above the sample median of IA_COUNT. If the effect of the IAF mandate on 
complier firms significantly strengthens when ACs utilize the new IAF at high levels, I expect δ6 
to be negative and significant. Table 4 presents the results of estimating Equation (2). As before, I 
provide results using both unbalanced (column 1) and entropy-balanced samples (column 2). In 
both columns, δ6 is significantly negative. Furthermore, while the total effect of TREAT when 
HIGH_IACOUNT = 1 (δ1 + δ4 + δ6) is significantly negative, the total effect of TREAT when 
HIGH_IACOUNT = 0 (δ1 + δ4) is insignificant. I interpret these results as strong evidence that 
                                                     
25 I omit the interaction term TREAT*HIGH_IACOUNT from Equation (2) because it is perfectly collinear with 
TREAT*POST*HIGH_IACOUNT. This occurs because HIGH_IACOUNT can only be zero in the pre-period for 
treatment firms. Thus, when POST equals zero, so does TREAT*HIGH_IACOUNT. When POST equals 1, the triple 
interaction simplifies to the double: TREAT*HIGH_IACOUNT. 
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complying with the IAF mandate only reduced restatement likelihood if such compliance was 
accompanied by significant utilization of the IAF by the AC. Simply adopting an IAF without 
instituting strong AC-IAF relations appears to have little impact on the reliability of financial 
reporting. In summary, the results in Tables 3 and 4 provide strong evidence in support of 
Hypothesis 1, i.e., that AC utilization of the IAF improves financial reporting reliability. 
Tests Using Detailed Analysis of AC Charter Contents 
To better understand the nature of interaction between the AC and the IAF and to test for the 
effects of different ways that ACs utilize IAFs (including tests of H2, H3, and H4), I select a 
random subsample of charters to read and code manually. Specifically, I begin with the sample of 
firms with data to compute all of the control variables in a restatement regression (i.e., requiring 
the control variables as described in Equation (1)), and randomly select 100 firms from each tercile 
of the distribution of firm size. I include all AC charters for these firms (n=923), along with 
charters (n=255) for firms that introduced an IAF at the time of the NYSE rule change in 2004 
(i.e., firms with charters in 2001 that made no mention of the IAF, but had charters post-2004 that 
do mention the IAF). Table 1, Panel B presents the details of creating this final sample of 1,088 
observations, which I refer to as the ‘detailed sample’. For these charters, I read each reference to 
the IAF and assign it to one of 51 categories of possible IAF references. For example, I identify 
firms with ACs that state their duty to meet regularly with the IAF (73 percent), to consult with 
the IAF regarding significant accounting matters (31 percent), to review the scope and results of 
IAF audits (76 percent and 65 percent), to ensure IAF independence and authority (20 percent and 
7 percent), and so on. See Appendix B for a full breakdown of the frequencies of the 51 different 
IAF references I analyze.  
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To make this data more tractable and to reduce concerns about multi-collinearity in the 
multivariate analysis that follows, I conduct a factor analysis that identifies five orthogonal factors 
with eigenvalues above one.26 Table 5 presents the results of the factor procedure. Together, the 
factors explain 84 percent of the cumulative variance in the individual variables. Based on the 
correlations between each factor and the individual variables, I interpret them as follows, where 
the leading Fs denote ‘factor’: (1) F1_MEET/REVIEW, (2) F2_FINANCIAL, (3) F3_AUDIT, (4) 
F4_INDEP, and (5) F5_COMPLIANCE capture the degree to which the AC (1) meets with and 
reviews the activities and recommendations of the IAF, (2) discusses the financial statements and 
alternative accounting treatments with the IAF, (3) reviews with the IAF any restrictions or 
problems experienced during their audits and any disagreements between the IAF and management 
or external auditor, (4) promotes the independence and authority of the IAF in the organization, 
and (5) reviews compliance and ethics matters with the IAF. In un-tabulated univariate analysis, I 
find that F1_MEET/REVIEW is significantly negatively correlated with RESTATEMENT, 
suggesting that AC monitoring of financial reporting is improved when ACs meet regularly with 
the IAF to discuss their activities and recommendations. I explore this further in the multivariate 
analysis that follows.   
To examine the relation between the five factor variables and financial reporting reliability, 
I estimate versions of the following equation: 
RESTATEMENTit= θ0 + θ1F1_MEET/REVIEWit + θ2F2_FINANCIALit + θ3F3_AUDITit         (3) 
+ θ4F4_INDEPit + θ5F5_COMPLIANCEit + ∑nControlsit + 𝜀it  
 
In this equation, the five factor variables are as described above and controls consist of the same 
control variables used in Equation (1), including industry fixed effects, as previously defined. I 
                                                     
26 I use an orthogonal (Varimax) rotation in calculating the factors. This procedure identifies 6 factors with eigenvalues 
above one, but the 6th factor has a low eigenvalue (1.25) and is not correlated with any of the individual variables at 
50 percent or more. I do not know how to interpret this factor and so I exclude it from the analysis. 
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also supplement Equation (3) with year fixed effects to control for variation across time that affects 
my entire sample.27   
Results of estimating Equation (3) are presented in Table 6. In column 1, the coefficient on 
F1_MEET/REVIEW is significantly negative (p = 0.05, marginal effect = -0.029). This finding is 
consistent with the assertion of the IIA that the AC is best served by communicating in person and 
building relationships with internal auditors, and not just through written reports (Chambers 2017). 
In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in F1_MEET/REVIEW is 
associated with a 13.9 percent decrease in restatement likelihood relative to the sample mean of 
RESTATEMENT.28 The coefficient on F2_FINANCIAL is also negative, though marginally 
significant (p = 0.11).29 I interpret these results as evidence that financial reporting reliability 
improves when ACs communicate with IAFs through face-to-face meetings to discuss IAF 
activities and recommendations.  
Test of Hypothesis 2 – The openness of communication  
For my second hypothesis, I argue that the benefits of utilizing the IAF as a resource to the 
AC occur because of the flow of information between them which at times can be sensitive and 
that when ACs cultivate an environment in which internal auditors feel comfortable sharing 
sensitive information, the likelihood is lower that important reporting issues identified by the IAF 
will go unaddressed. To test this, I introduce the variable OPEN_COM to Equation (3), along with 
its interaction with all five factor variables. OPEN_COM is an indicator variable equal to one for 
                                                     
27 I cannot perform difference-in-differences analyses using the ‘detailed sample’ because sample sizes become 
prohibitively small.  
28 I use the descriptive statistics (un-tabulated but available upon request) to calculate this economic significance as 
the marginal effect of F1_MEET/REVIEW (0.029) multiplied by the standard deviation of F1_MEET/REVIEW (0.940) 
scaled by the mean of RESTATEMENT (0.196). 
29 Unexpectedly, F5_COMPLIANCE is positively associated with RESTATEMENT (p = 0.06). One possible 
interpretation of this result is that IAF detection of compliance issues may result in more financial reporting fixes that 
take longer to implement, leading to more restatements (as compared to reporting oversight that results in timely 
corrections prior to issuing financial statements). 
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AC charters that state the AC’s duty to maintain free and open communications among the AC, 
IAF, and external auditor, and zero otherwise. If ACs can proactively promote an environment 
wherein internal auditors communicate more openly, I expect IAF utilization to improve reporting 
reliability more when OPEN_COM = 1. Results are presented in column (2) of Table 6. I interpret 
the significantly negative interaction between F1_MEETREVIEW and OPEN_COM (p = 0.014, 
marginal effect = -0.079) as evidence that the benefits of meeting with the IAF are stronger when 
ACs commit to promoting open communication. A one standard deviation increase in 
F1_MEET/REVIEW (i.e., its total marginal effect when OPEN_COM = 1) is associated with a 39 
percent decrease in the likelihood of restating (relative to the sample mean of RESTATEMENT). 
Test of Hypothesis 3 – The independence and authority of the IAF 
For my third hypothesis, I argue that the financial reporting reliability benefits of utilizing 
the IAF as a resource to the AC should increase when the AC promotes the objectivity and 
authority of the IAF. To test this hypothesis, I estimate Equation (3) with interactions between 
F4_INDEP and the four other factor variables. As reported in Table 7, the interaction between 
F1_MEET/REVIEW and F4_INDEP is significantly negative (p = 0.03, marginal effect = -0.037). 
This result is consistent with Hypothesis 3 and suggests that the value of the IAF as a resource to 
the AC is greater when the AC promotes the independence and authority of the IAF.  
The factor variable F4_INDEP is driven largely by variation in whether ACs review IAF 
independence and/or authority (see factor loading in Table 5). I next examine which of these 
underlying variables (i.e., AC attention to IAF independence or authority) drive the result in Table 
7. Specifically, I replace the independence factor variable with the two major underlying indicator 
variables: an indicator equal to one for AC charters that include the duty to promote IA 
independence (REVIEW_IA_INDEP) and an indicator equal to one for AC charters that include 
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the duty to review IA authority (REVIEW_IA_AUTH). Each of these underlying indicator variables 
is interacted with the four remaining factor variables. In un-tabulated analysis, I find a significantly 
negative coefficient on F1_MEET_REVIEW*REVIEW_IA_INDEP (p = 0.052), and a negative but 
insignificant coefficient on F1_MEET_REVIEW*REVIEW_IA_AUTH (p = 0.276). Thus, having 
face-to-face meetings between the AC and IAF to discuss the scope and results of IAF audits 
improves reporting reliability more when the AC also promotes the independence of the IAF. The 
corresponding result for promoting IAF authority is directionally consistent but much weaker. In 
summary, I interpret the results in Table 7 as evidence that utilizing the IAF as a resource yields 
greater benefits when the AC works to protect the value of that resource by promoting IAF 
independence. 
Test of Hypothesis 4 – The ‘busyness’ of the AC 
For my fourth hypothesis, I argue that the benefits to the AC of utilizing the IAF as a resource 
should increase with the busyness of AC members. To test this, I introduce the variable BUSY_AC 
to Equation (3), along with its interaction with all five factor variables.  I measure the busyness of 
each AC by calculating the average number of board positions (across different companies) held 
by its members in each year. BUSY_AC is equal to one for ACs that average two or more board 
positions per member, and zero otherwise.30 Results of this analysis are presented in Table 8. The 
interaction between F1_MEET/REVIEW and BUSY_AC is significantly negative (p = 0.01, 
marginal effect = -0.084), suggesting that face-to-face meetings between the AC and IAF help 
improve reporting reliability more when AC members are busy.31 I interpret these results as 
                                                     
30 I argue that having at least one additional board position on average (two total) is enough to tax the attention of AC 
members such that reliance on the IAF becomes more important. My results are robust to using three (p50) or four 
(p75) board positions as the cutoff in defining BUSY_AC. 
31 This result is also consistent with the interpretation that AC members with multiple board appointments are in 
greater demand as directors because of their ability, and more capable AC members may be more adept at utilizing an 
IAF effectively. To provide a test of H4 not subject to this alternative interpretation, I also measure AC busyness using 
the size of the AC. Inherent to this proxy is the assumption that smaller ACs must accomplish a similar amount of 
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evidence consistent with Hypothesis 4, that the value to the AC of meeting with the IAF (to discuss 
the scope and results of internal audits) is greater when AC members are stretched thin and need 
extra help in monitoring financial reporting. 
Loan Analyses 
In this section, I explore whether utilizing the IAF as a resource to the AC can benefit the 
firm in loan contracting by allowing for a relaxation of costly monitoring by private lenders.32 I 
craft a sample of loan facilities (with data from DealScan) that are supplemented with borrower 
characteristics (including AC charter variables) measured as of the fiscal year end prior to loan 
origination. To maximize power, I use the base sample of 10,165 charters in this merge with 
DealScan. Requiring firm controls and charter data results in a sample of 3,017 loan facility 
observations (See Table 1, Panel C).  
In un-tabulated univariate analysis, I compare variable means across the subsamples of 
contracts where IA_INDICATOR is equal to 1 and 0. Loan contracts for firms with ACs that have 
access to an IAF exhibit significantly smaller interest spreads, larger loan amounts, less 
collateralization, and fewer covenants, compared to those without. In multivariate analysis, I focus 
on interest spreads as a way to quantify a financial effect of utilizing the IAF. Specifically, I model 
spreads as a function of AC charter-based IAF variables and controls, estimating the following 
equation: 
INTERESTk = η0 + η1IAF_Variableit + η2SIZEit + η3FIRMAGEit + η4ROAit                                  (4) 
+ η5RATINGit + η6INTANGIBILITYit + η7LEVERAGEit + η8MTBit  
+ η9LOANSIZEk + η10MATURITYk + Industrym +Yeart + 𝜀k. 
                                                     
oversight as larger ACs, such that, on average, the individual members of small ACs must undertake more duties. In 
un-tabulated analysis, I find that the association between F1_MEET/REVIEW and RESTATEMENT is significantly 
stronger when ACs are small (below the sample median of the number of AC members).   
32 I focus on bank lenders for the following reasons: First, bank lenders invest significantly in borrowers and thus have 
concentrated interests in their borrowers’ performance and governance. Such strong incentives to monitor 
management make any observed relaxation of monitoring especially salient. Second, lenders have private access to 
borrowers and can more readily perceive and adjust to IAF monitoring activities. Third, the availability of objective 
measures of loan terms increases the validity of the empirical tests. 
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In this equation, INTERESTk is the all-in spread drawn from the DealScan database for loan k, in 
basis points over LIBOR. Because my sample of loan contracts does not coincide significantly 
with the AC charters I manually analyzed, I resort to the simpler count-based measures of IAF 
utilization available for all charters. IAF_Variableit serves as a placeholder for one of 
IA_INDICATORit, HIGH_IACOUNTit, or LOG_IACOUNTit, measured for borrower i of loan k as 
of year t prior to loan origination. In terms of firm and loan characteristics, I follow the debt 
contracting model of Campello and Gao (2017) by including borrower characteristics of borrower 
i in the fiscal year t ending prior to loan origination (including SIZEit, FIRMAGEit, ROAit, 
RATINGit, INTANGIBILITYit, LEVERAGEit, MTBit) and characteristics of loan k (including 
LOAN_SIZEk, and MATURITYk). I also include fixed effects for year and industry.  
 Table 9 presents the results of estimating Equation (4). In column 1, IA_INDICATOR is 
significantly negatively associated with loan spreads (p = 0.002). The point estimate suggests that 
firms with ACs that utilize IAFs have loan spreads that are 31 basis points lower than firms with 
ACs that do not. The coefficient on HIGH_IACOUNT in column 2 is also significantly negative 
(p-value = 0.005). I interpret these results as evidence of a financial benefit that arises when ACs 
utilize the IAF more. Since the sample in column 3 is limited to observations for which 
IA_INDICATOR = 1, I interpret the negative coefficient on LOG_IACOUNT (p-value = 0.08) as 
evidence of an incremental loan pricing benefit to ACs utilizing the IAF above and beyond any 
effect of simply having an IAF. In summary, the more that ACs utilize the IAF at the time of 
lending negotiations, the lower their firms’ cost of borrowing. These effects are robust to 
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controlling for the announcement of a restatement (un-tabulated), suggesting that lenders perceive 
benefits of IAF monitoring that extend beyond the reduction of restatements.33  
I also examine loan spreads using the difference-in-differences design around the NYSE 
exogenous rule change, as discussed in Section 4.2 (i.e.: INTEREST = TREAT + POST + 
TREAT*POST + controls). Results are reported in Table 10. In column 1, the difference-in-
differences estimator (α3) is significant and negative (p = 0.03), suggesting that firms needing to 
comply with the IAF rule change experienced a greater decline in loan spreads relative to firms 
that had an IAF all along. This trend remains in the entropy-balanced sample as reported in column 
2 (p = 0.07). I interpret these results as strong evidence that lenders perceive and price AC 
utilization of the IAF, resulting in cost savings for borrowers.  
Additional Tests 
I explore whether the benefits of utilizing the IAF as a resource to the AC manifest in ways 
other than restatements. In un-tabulated analysis, I find that when the AC utilizes the IAF, period-
end reporting is more efficient (the number of days between a firm’s fiscal year end and the date 
of the 10-K filing is smaller) and earnings management is reduced (the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals is lower). I also find some evidence that AC utilization of the IAF reduces 
the likelihood of a material weakness in internal control (especially when the AC promotes an 
environment of open communication).  
Robustness 
The potential for bias could arise in my tests if the choice to utilize an IAF is driven by 
unobserved factors which also drive the incidence of misstatements. To assess the meaningfulness 
of this potential bias, I follow Frank (2000) and Choudhary, Merkley, and Schipper (2019) in 
                                                     




calculating the impact threshold an omitted variable must meet to invalidate my inferences at a 
significance level of 0.10 (un-tabulated). For example, in order for the baseline result in column 2 
of Table 3 to be invalidated, an omitted variable would have to be correlated with both the test and 
outcome variables at 0.153 or greater. This seems unlikely given that the correlations between 
RESTATEMENT and observed covariates (Table 2, Panel B) are all lower than 0.12. When 
calculating impact thresholds for all reported tests (un-tabulated but available upon request), I 
conclude similarly that bias due to omitted correlated variables is unlikely to drive my results. 
In further unreported analysis, I confirm that my inferences are robust to multiple 
alternative treatments, including the following: (1) estimation of parsimonious models by 
excluding the governance and audit control variables; (2) estimation using OLS instead of logistic 
regression when the dependent variable is binary; and (3) controlling for the number of references 
to the external auditor in the AC charter.  
V. Conclusion 
Because of inherent limitations, audit committees necessarily rely on a source of information 
about a firm’s accounting and internal control processes in their financial reporting oversight role. 
I hypothesize that due to internal auditors’ inside knowledge and objectivity, the internal audit 
function (IAF) can be a valuable source of information, if utilized by the audit committee (AC). I 
use data in AC charters to study the financial reporting reliability implications of ACs utilizing an 
IAF. In exploiting an exogenous NYSE rule change that required firms to have an IAF, I run 
difference-in-differences tests which show an increase in financial reporting reliability (fewer 
restatements) for firms that adopt an IAF to comply with the mandate, relative to firms that had 
IAFs all along. This improvement is concentrated in the set of firms that not only adopt a new IAF 
but also have ACs that utilize the new IAF significantly.  
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Using detailed content analyses of references to the IAF in AC charters, I provide insight 
into how ACs utilize IAFs and which activities result in financial reporting reliability 
improvements. Specifically, I find that the likelihood of a restatement is lower when the AC meets 
face-to-face and privately with the IAF, discussing the IAF work plan, their findings, and 
recommendations. These effects are stronger when the AC protects the flow and quality of 
information by ensuring open communication between the groups and by promoting the 
independence of the IAF in the organization. Furthermore, utilizing an IAF improves reporting 
reliability more when AC members are stretched thin by significant duties and multiple board 
appointments. I also provide evidence of an economic outcome of AC utilization of the IAF in the 
form of lower cost of private debt. By quantifying these benefits, my evidence informs the debate 
in practice as to whether IAF implementation is worth the investment. This study highlights that 
AC effectiveness in financial reporting oversight depends not only on readily observable AC 




Appendix A   
Variable definitions 
   
Variable  Definition 
Test variables based on counts of IAF references in AC charters: 
  IA_INDICATOR = one if the term “internal audit” appears in the audit committee charter one or more times; zero otherwise. 
 (LOG_IACOUNT) IA_COUNT = (the log of one plus) the number of times the term “internal audit” appears in the audit committee charter. 
 HIGH_IACOUNT = one if IACOUNT is above the sample median; zero otherwise. 
 
TREAT = 
one for all observations for firms that make no mention of the IAF in their AC charter until after the 
NYSE rule change in 2004. 
 
HIGH_TREAT = 
one for all observations for firms that make no mention of the IAF in their AC charter before the NYSE 
rule change in 2004 and are above the median number of IAF references after the rule change. 
Test variables based on factor analysis of the various types of IAF references in AC charters: 
 
F1_MEET/REVIEW = 
a summary factor variable resulting from a factor analysis of all manually-coded IAF references in AC 
charters. MEET/REVIEW varies strongly with AC duties to (1) meet with the IAF and (2) review the 
IAF's scope, budget, and staffing.  
 
F2_FINANCIAL = 
a summary factor variable resulting from a factor analysis of all manually-coded IAF references in AC 
charters. FINANCIAL varies strongly with AC duty to (1) review financial statement with the IAF, 
including alternative GAAP treatments, off-balance sheet arrangements, and the MD&A section. 
 
F3_AUDIT = 
a summary factor variable resulting from a factor analysis of all manually-coded IAF references in AC 
charters. AUDIT varies strongly with AC duties to (1) review with the IAF the restrictions, problems, and 
disagreements they encountered in their audit work. 
 
F4_INDEP = 
a summary factor variable resulting from a factor analysis of all manually-coded IAF references in AC 
charters. INDEP varies strongly with AC duty to review the IAF's authority in the organization and 
independence from management. 
 
F5_COMPLIANCE = 
a summary factor variable resulting from a factor analysis of all manually-coded IAF references in AC 
charters. COMPLIANCE varies strongly with AC duty to review compliance and ethics with the IAF. 
Test variables based individual types of IAF references in AC charters: 
 
OPEN_COM = 
one if the AC charter references a duty to maintain free and open communications among the AC, IAF, 
and external auditor; zero otherwise. 
 REVIEW_IA_INDEP = one for AC charters that include the duty to promote IA independence; zero otherwise. 
 REVIEW_IA_AUTHORITY = one for AC charters that include the duty to promote IA authority; zero otherwise.  
    
Outcome variables: 
 
RESTATEMENT = one if the financial statements for firm i in year t were subsequently restated; zero otherwise. 
 
INTEREST = the all-in spread drawn from the DealScan database (in basis points over LIBOR). 
Other control variables: 
 
AC_EXPERTISE = 
one if firm i had an accounting financial expert on the AC in year t (zero otherwise). Accounting financial 
expert is defined as someone who has prior experience working as a(n): Auditor, Chief Financial Officer, 
Accounting Officer, Chief Accountant, Controller, Certified Public Accountant, Chartered Accountant, 
Head of Accounting, VP of Accounting, Accounting Director, Vice President of Finance, or Treasurer. 
 
AC_MEETINGS = 
the number of meetings held by the audit committee of firm i in year t. (TOP_ACMEETINGS is an 
indicator equal to one if AC_MEETINGS is above the sample median.) 
 AC_SIZE = the number of audit committee members for firm i in year t. 
 ACQUISITION = one if there was an acquisition by firm i in year t; zero otherwise. 
 AUDITFEES = the natural log of audit fees for firm i in year t. 
 AUDITOREXPERTISE = one if audit office j for firm i has the most audit fees in MSA y for industry x; zero otherwise. 





Appendix A, Cont. 
Variable definitions 
 
Variable  Definition 
Control variables, cont. 
 
 
 BIGN = one if firm i had a Big 4 auditor in year t; zero otherwise. 
 BOARD_INDEP = the ratio of independent board members to total board members for firm i in year t.  
 BOARD_SIZE = the total number of members of the board of directors for firm i in year t. 
 BUS_SEGMENTS = the natural log of the number of business segments for firm i in year t. 
 
BUSY_AC = 
one for firm-year observations for which the average number of board positions held by AC members is 
greater than or equal to two; zero otherwise. 
 
BUSY_BOARD = 
one if at least half of the independent board members for firm i serve simultaneously on at least three 
boards in year t; zero otherwise. 
 CEO_CHAIR = one if the CEO is Chairman of the Board for firm i in year t; zero otherwise. 
 FIRMAGE = the age of firm i in years as of year t (i.e., the number of years since first appearing in Compustat). 
 FOREIGN = the ratio of foreign sales to total sales for firm i in year t. 
 INDEP_DIR_TENURE = the average number of years independent directors have been board members for firm i. 
 INST_BLOCKHOLDERS = the number of institutional block-holders (minimum 5 percent stakeholders) of firm i in year t.  
 INST_OWNERSHIP = the percent of firm i owned by institutional owners in year t. 
 INTANGIBILITY = the ratio of intangible to total assets for firm i in year t. 
 INVENTORY = the ratio of inventory to total assets for firm i in year t. 
 ISSUANCE = one if firm i issued equity or debt equal to more than 10 percent of total assets in year t; zero otherwise. 
 LEVERAGE = the ratio of long-term debt to total assets for firm i in year t. 
 LOAN_SIZE = the log of loan size (in millions of dollars). 
 LOSS = one if firm i had net income less than 0 in year t; zero otherwise. 
 MATERIAL_WEAKNESS = one if firm i reported a SOX404 material weakness in internal control in year t; zero otherwise. 
 MATURITY = the loan's maturity in months. 
 MODOP = 
one if the auditor's report for firm i includes a qualified opinion (or unqualified with emphasis) in year t; 
zero otherwise. 
 MTB = the ratio of market capitalization to total common equity for firm i in year t. 
 NONAUDITFEES = the natural log of non-audit fees for firm i in year t. 
 NUMLENDER = the total number of lenders participating in the loan syndicate. 
 POST = one for all observations in years 2004 and later (after the NYSE IAF rule change) 
 
RATING = the Compustat S&P credit rating, where a lower value represents a better credit rating. 
 RESTRUCTURE = one if firm i had restructuring in year t; zero otherwise. 
 ROA = the ratio of net income to total assets for firm i in year t. 
 SIZE = the natural log of total assets for firm i in year t. 
 
ZSCORE = 
1.2 * (current assets - current liabilities / total assets) + 1.4 * (retained earnings / total assets) + 3.3 * 
(earnings before interest and taxes / total assets) + .6 *(market cap / total assets) + (sales / total assets). 
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Appendix B        
Panel A: Brief descriptions of IAF-related references in AC charters and their frequency (n = 1,088) 
     Consult        Communicate        External Audit  
1. Review IA findings and results 64.8%  23. Meet periodically with IA 75.9%  41. Review perf/indep. of auditor with IA 18.2% 
2. Review internal controls with IA 52.2%  24. Meet privately with IA 72.7%  42. Review external audit findings with IA 2.9% 
3. Review management responses to findings 41.6%  25. Keep free/open communications with IA 41.7%  43. Review annual audit plan with IA 2.4% 
4. Discuss accounting/reporting issues with IA 31.1%  26. Inquire about audit problems or difficulties 12.3%    
5. Discuss anything that IA chooses 21.5%  27. AC has unrestricted access to IA 4.1%        IA audit committee duties   
6. Review risk management with IA 20.3%     44. IA helps develop AC meeting agenda 0.6% 
7. Review ethics and code of conduct with IA 15.5%        Evaluate   45. IA head serves as secretary to the AC 0.4% 
8. Review legal/regulatory compliance with IA 14.6%  28. Assess performance 69.5%  46. IA provides training to the AC 0.5% 
9. Review quarterly/annual financials with IA 7.8%  29. Hire/fire/evaluate IA head 46.1%  47. IA head is a member of the AC  0.2% 
10. Review disagreements between IA and others 6.7%  30. Report IA performance to full board 15.4%    
11. Review management judgments with IA 6.3%             Other   
12. Discuss fraud with IA 5.5%         Independence and authorization    48. Charter refers to outsourced IA services 11.2% 
13. Review MD&A with IA 5.2%  31. Review IA independence/objectivity 19.5%  49. AC permitted to rely on IA expertise  4.2% 
14. Review manager perqs and expenses with IA 4.1%  32. IA reports directly to AC 9.7%  50. IA reports functionally to management 3.0% 
15. Review related party transactions with IA 4.5%  33. Review IA status and authority 6.7%  51. Charter language suggests there is no IA 2.7% 
16. Review off-balance sheet structures with IA 3.8%         
17. Discuss alternative GAAP methods with IA 3.7%         Oversight      
18. IA scope includes data security 2.5%  34. Review planned IA scope 76.5%    
19. Assign and review IA special investigations 2.2%  35. Review staffing and qualifications of IA 54.5%    
20. Discuss quality of accounting staff with IA 1.9%  36. Review IA budget 42.3%    
21. Discuss non-GAAP disclosures with IA 0.6%  37. Review IA coordination w/ ext. audit 37.6%    
22. IA runs the fraud hotline 0.3%  38. Ensure no unjustified restrictions on IA 9.7%    
   39. Review the IA charter 8.9%    
   40. Review effectiveness of IT usage in IA 0.7%    
        
 
This panel presents data resulting from my review of 1,088 randomly-selected AC charters. See Table 1, Panel B for a description of this sample. For each of these charters, I manually read each reference to 
the IAF and determine its classification. This process results in 51 unique types of IAF references. The grouping of individual types into the eight summary categories seen here is done for presentation 




Appendix B        
Panel B: Examples of the ten most common IAF-related references in AC charters 
   
Description Freq. Company name (Date of proxy filing): Text of IAF reference in AC charter 
Review planned IA scope (#34) 76.5% 
Carolina National Corp. (2006-04-03): “The Board of Directors hereby delegates to the audit committee the authority to 
[…] review and approve the proposed internal audit plan for the coming year.” 
Meet periodically with IA (#23) 75.9% 
Radio One, Inc. (2004-04-27): “At least quarterly, the Audit Committee shall meet with each of the following: (i) the 
independent auditor; (ii) the Company’s management; and (iii) the Company’s internal audit function.” 
Meet privately with IA (#24) 72.7% 
Crocs, Inc. (2006-10-06): “On a regular basis, [the AC shall] meet separately with the internal audit director (or 
equivalent position) to discuss any matters that the committee or internal audit believes should be discussed privately.” 
Assess performance (#28) 69.5% 
XTO Energy (2004-04-21): “The Committee’s primary responsibilities are to: assist the Board of Directors in its 
oversight of […] the performance of the Company’s internal audit function.” 
Review IA findings and results (#1) 64.8% First Indiana Corp. (2002-03-15): “[The AC shall] review significant reports prepared by the internal audit department.” 
Review staffing and qualifications of IA (#35) 54.5% 
Sky Financial Group (2004-03-04): “[The AC shall] periodically review the adequacy of Internal Audit resources and the 
competency/ qualifications of individuals assigned to the function.” 
Review internal controls with IA (#2) 52.2% 
Zimmer Holdings, Inc. (2003-3-24): “The Committee shall discuss the quality and adequacy of the Company’s internal 
controls with management and the internal auditors.” 
Hire/fire/evaluate IA head (#29) 46.1% 
PetSmart Inc. (2003-05-12): “[The AC shall] review and concur in the appointment, replacement, reassignment or 
discharge of the Director of Internal Audit.” 
Review IA budget (#36) 42.3% 
Whole Foods Market, Inc. (2005-03-14): “[The AC is responsible for] reviewing and approving the annual internal audit 
plan and budget and assessing the appropriateness of resources allocated to internal auditing.” 
Keep free/open communications with IA (#25) 41.7% 
Buckeye Technologies, Inc. (2001-09-26):  “It is the responsibility of the committee to maintain free and open 
communication between the committee, independent auditors, the internal auditors and management of the Company.” 
 
This panel presents excerpts from AC charters as examples for each of the ten most common IAF reference types. The numbers in parentheses to the right of the variable descriptions correspond to the 
numbers assigned to each variable in Panel A of this appendix. The company names and proxy filing dates can be used to access the filings that contain the AC charters via www.sec.gov/edgar. While the 








































This figure plots the mean values of IA_INDICATOR for each year from 2001 to 2006. 
IA_INDICATOR is equal to one for AC charters that make at least one reference to the 
IAF, and zero otherwise. The sample of charters is grouped by stock exchange (NYSE 





Time trend of RESTATEMENT  
 
 
This figure illustrates the time trends of the mean of the variable RESTATEMENT for treatment and control firms. The 
sample is limited to those firms included in the tests in Table 5 (i.e., NYSE firms with AC charter data). Treatment 
firms (TREAT = 1) are those that “complied” with the 2004 rule change at NYSE which required listed firms to 
maintain an IAF that interfaces with the AC. Control firms (TREAT = 0) are those “early adopters” which maintained 
an IAF through the entire sample period (2000 – 2006). I measure TREAT using references to the IAF in AC charters. 
Years which exhibit statistically significant differences across treatment and control are marked with * (under one-
























Treat=0 (voluntary adopters) Treat=1 (compliers)
* * * * 
Effective date of NYSE  
rule to require an IAF 
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Panel A: NYSE sample 
   Firm years 
Charter observations (2000-2006) 
 
 10,165 
    
       Require merge with Compustat   (594) 
       Require merge with Thomson-Reuters and BoardEx   (3,194) 
       Require merge with Audit Analytics   0 
Firm years at the intersection of required databases   6,377 
    
      Require NYSE = 1   (3,401) 
      Drop 2002 and 2003 observations   (777) 
      Require data to compute variables   (153) 
Firm years available for tests using the NYSE rule change   2,046 
    
    
    
Panel B: Subsample for detail analysis of charter contents (“detailed sample”) 
  Firms Firm years 
Randomly select 100 firms from each tercile of firm size distribution, with: 300  
(1) IA_INDICATOR = 1 before and after the 2004 NYSE rule change   
(2) data to estimate restatement regressions    
                        Total charter observations for sample of 300 constant firms  923 
    
Select full sample of unique NYSE firms with:  79  
(1) IA_INDICATOR = 0 in 2001 but 1 after 2004 NYSE rule change  
(2) data to estimate restatement regressions    
                        Total charter observations for sample of change firms  255 
Total charter observations coded manually   1,178 
    
      Drop observations for which industry FE perfectly predicts RESTATEMENT (90) 
Firm years available for tests using sample of charters with detailed coding  1,088 
    
 
Panel C: Loan contracting sample 
   Facilities 
Loan facilities in DealScan (2001-2007)   26,954 
       Require an AC charter observation for borrower in year prior to loan origination (23,715) 
       Require data to compute variables   (222) 
Facility observations available for loan contracting tests   3,017 
    





Descriptive statistics and correlations (n = 2,046) 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable  Mean  P25  Median  P75  S.D. 
Dependent variable and key test variables 
   IA_COUNT  8.49  4.00  8.00  12.00  5.35 
   RESTATEMENT  0.18  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.38 
   TREAT  0.12  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.32 
   POST  0.69  0.00  1.00  1.00  0.46 
 
Audit committee and governance variables 
   AC_MEETINGS  6.95  4.00  6.00  9.00  3.51 
   AC_EXPERTISE  0.66  0.00  1.00  1.00  0.48 
   AC_SIZE  4.41  3.00  4.00  5.00  1.25 
   BOARD_SIZE  12.70  11.00  13.00  15.00  3.19 
   BOARD_INDEP  0.54  0.44  0.55  0.63  0.14 
   CEO_CHAIR  0.65  0.00  1.00  1.00  0.48 
   INDEP_DIR_TENURE  7.12  4.35  6.71  9.47  3.76 
   BUSY_BOARD  0.26  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.44 
   INST_OWNERSHIP  0.52  0.16  0.61  0.81  0.35 
   INST_BLOCKHOLDERS  2.04  1.00  2.00  3.00  1.53 
              
Audit and auditor characteristics           
   MATERIAL_WEAKNESS  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.22 
   MODOP  0.40  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.49 
   AUDITORTENURE  4.25  3.00  4.00  6.00  1.89 
   AUDITOREXPERTISE  0.64  0.00  1.00  1.00  0.48 
  AUDITFEES  14.18  13.35  14.16  14.95  1.20 
  NONAUDITFEES  12.76  11.91  13.04  14.15  2.56 
   BIGN  0.96  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.19 
 
Firm characteristics 
   MTB  3.05  1.61  2.21  3.44  3.22 
   FIRMAGE  27.97  12.00  23.00  44.00  17.19 
   SIZE  7.74  6.71  7.60  8.65  1.47 
   FOREIGN  0.54  0.00  0.10  0.98  0.74 
   BUS_SEGMENTS  1.08  0.69  1.39  1.61  0.63 
   ISSUANCE  0.35  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.48 
   LEVERAGE  0.22  0.07  0.20  0.32  0.18 
   ROA  0.05  0.02  0.04  0.08  0.07 
   LOSS  0.09  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.29 
   ACQUISITION  0.11  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.32 
   RESTRUCTURE  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.14 
   INVENTORY  0.10  0.00  0.05  0.15  0.13 
   ZSCORE  2.42  1.06  2.22  3.40  1.66 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics (in Panel A) and select correlations (in Panel B) for variables used in the NYSE rule-change analyses 









Table 2, Cont. 
Descriptive statistics and correlations (n = 2,046) 
Panel B: Select correlations 
                     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
1 RESTATEMENT                    
2 TREAT 0.02                   
3 POST 0.00 -0.11                  
4 AC_MEETINGS 0.02 -0.06 0.5                 
5 AC_EXPERTISE -0.02 -0.05 0.29 0.2                
6 AC_SIZE -0.03 -0.11 0.05 0.13 0.1               
7 BOARD_SIZE 0.01 -0.07 -0.12 0.16 -0.04 0.47              
8 BOARD_INDEP -0.05 -0.19 0.46 0.23 0.17 0.27 0.05             
9 CEO_CHAIR -0.06 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 0.10 0.08 0.18            
10 INDEP_DIR_TENURE -0.01 0.08 0.00 -0.01 -0.11 -0.01 0.10 0.04 0.02           
11 BUSY_BOARD -0.05 -0.03 -0.10 -0.03 -0.06 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.07 -0.05          
12 INST_OWNERSHIP -0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.15 0.01         
13 MTB -0.07 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.02        
14 SIZE -0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.21 -0.03 0.36 0.57 0.12 0.17 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.23       
15 FOREIGN -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.18      
16 BUS_SEGMENTS -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.10 -0.03 0.00 -0.04     
17 ISSUANCE 0.04 0.08 -0.05 -0.10 -0.01 -0.15 -0.17 -0.05 -0.02 -0.08 -0.06 -0.02 0.04 -0.14 -0.08 0.01    
18 LEVERAGE 0.00 0.06 -0.05 -0.09 -0.02 -0.05 -0.08 -0.02 0.00 -0.12 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.07 -0.12 0.03 0.41   
19 ROA -0.12 -0.01 0.09 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.06 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.34 0.18 0.07 -0.02 -0.06 -0.18  
20 LOSS 0.09 0.01 -0.11 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.14 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.11 -0.51 
                     
                     
 
This table presents descriptive statistics (in Panel A) and select correlations (in Panel B) for variables used in the NYSE rule-change analyses (using the ‘NYSE 




Table 3  
Panel A: The financial reporting reliability effects of the 2004 NYSE rule change  
  (1) (2) 
 Dependent variable =  RESTATEMENT RESTATEMENT 
 Sample: Unbalanced Entropy-balanced 
 





   TREAT β1 0.510 1.81 * ( 0.061) 0.626 1.84 * ( 0.073) 
   POST β2 -0.090 -0.34  (-0.011) -0.304 -0.66  (-0.036) 
   TREAT*POST β3 -0.693 -2.22 ** (-0.083) -1.021 -2.85 *** (-0.119) 
   AC_MEETINGS -0.028 -1.18   -0.019 -0.41   
   AC_EXPERTISE -0.184 -1.17   -0.074 -0.30   
   AC_SIZE -0.103 -1.47   -0.188 -1.72 *  
   BOARD_SIZE 0.028 0.87   -0.081 -1.58   
   BOARD_INDEP -0.413 -0.62   -0.520 -0.51   
   CEO_CHAIR -0.309 -2.04 **  -0.783 -3.40 ***  
   INDEP_DIR_TENURE 0.004 0.16   0.027 1.02   
   BUSY_BOARD -0.253 -1.48   -0.465 -1.96 **  
   INST_OWNERSHIP -0.506 -2.13 **  -0.428 -1.14   





   MATERIAL_WEAKNESS 2.638 10.1 *** 
 
2.747 6.44 *** 
 
   MODOP 0.356 2.41 **  0.534 2.36 **  
   AUDITORTENURE 0.075 1.43   0.115 1.22   
   AUDITOREXPERTISE 0.052 0.32   0.177 0.70   
   AUDITFEES -0.044 -0.33   0.084 0.43   
   NONAUDITFEES 0.024 0.62   0.084 1.20   








   FIRMAGE -0.004 -0.55   -0.006 -0.56   
   SIZE 0.088 0.85   0.169 1.00   
   FOREIGN -0.073 -0.47   -0.064 -0.33   
   BUS_SEGMENTS -0.185 -1.34   0.157 0.64   
   ISSUANCE 0.484 2.89 ***  0.448 1.76 *  
   LEVERAGE -0.127 -0.24   -0.449 -0.58   
   ROA -2.899 -1.74 *  -1.489 -0.67   
   LOSS 0.096 0.39   0.425 1.19   
   ACQUISITION -0.285 -1.23   -0.340 -1.06   
   RESTRUCTURE 0.209 0.49   1.082 1.06   
   INVENTORY -0.039 -0.03   1.331 0.75   
   ZSCORE -0.041 -0.48   -0.166 -1.40   
Sum of 
coefficients   β1 + β3     [χ2] -0.183 [0.38] 
 
(-0.022) -0.396 [1.49] 
 
(-0.046) 
Fixed Effects Industry  Industry  
Pseudo R2 0.161  0.255  
Observations 2,046  2,046  
This table reports results of logistic regressions analyzing a 2004 NYSE rule change that required listed firms to maintain an IAF that interfaces 
with the AC. The sample consists of NYSE firms with at least one charter observation both before and after the rule change (‘NYSE sample’, 
as described in Panel A of Table 1). The dependent variable is RESTATEMENT. TREAT is equal to one for all observations for firms that made 
no mention of the IAF in their AC charter until after the rule change (compliers) and zero for all observations for firms that mention the IAF in 
their AC charter in both pre- and post-periods (early adopters). All other observations are removed from the sample. POST is equal to one for 
observations in 2004 and later. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. Industry is defined using 2-digit SIC. z-statistics are based on 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels. 
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Table 3, cont.  
Panel B: The financial reporting reliability effects of the 2004 NYSE rule change  
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable =  RESTATEMENT RESTATEMENT 
Sample: Unbalanced Entropy-balanced 
Independent variable Coefficient z-stat  (Marg. Eff.) Coefficient z-stat  (Marg. Eff.) 
         
HIGH_TREAT γ1 0.340 0.95  ( 0.041) -0.141 -0.36  (-0.016) 
POST γ2 -0.143 -0.56  (-0.017) -0.697 -1.57  (-0.081) 
HIGH_TREAT*POST γ3 -1.051 -2.21 ** (-0.127) -1.069 -2.07 ** (-0.125) 
         
Sum of coefficients         
 γ1 + γ3             [χ2]                                    -0.711 [3.58] * (-0.086) -1.210 [9.51] *** (-0.141) 
         
Controls Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Industry Industry 
Pseudo R2 0.162 0.259 
Observations 2,046 2,046 
 
This table reports results of logistic regressions analyzing a 2004 NYSE rule change that required listed firms to maintain an IAF that interfaces 
with the AC. The sample consists of NYSE firms with at least one charter observation both before and after the rule change (‘NYSE sample, as 
described in Panel A of Table 1). The dependent variable is RESTATEMENT. HIGH_TREAT is equal to one for all observations for firms that 
made no mention of the IAF in their AC charter prior to the rule change but are above the sample median of IA_COUNT in the post period 
(compliers) and zero for all observations for firms that mention the IAF in their AC charter in both pre- and post-periods (early adopters). All 
other observations are removed from the sample. POST is equal to one for observations in 2004 and later. The intercepts and controls (following 
Equation (1)), while included in the regressions, are repressed for brevity. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. Industry is defined 
using 2-digit SIC. z-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 






Table 4  
The financial reporting reliability effects of the 2004 NYSE rule change  
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable =  RESTATEMENT RESTATEMENT 
Sample: Unbalanced Entropy-balanced 
Independent variable Coefficient z-stat  (Marg. Eff.) Coefficient z-stat  (Marg. Eff.) 
         
TREAT δ1 0.446 1.48  ( 0.054) 0.461 1.26  ( 0.053) 
POST δ2 -0.348 -1.06  (-0.042) -0.939 -1.74 * (-0.108) 
HIGH_IACOUNT δ3 -0.136 -0.52  (-0.016) -0.257 -0.65  (-0.029) 
TREAT * POST δ4 -0.045 -0.11  (-0.005) 0.062 0.12  ( 0.007) 
POST*HIGH_IACOUNT δ5 0.378 1.11  ( 0.045) 0.850 1.63  ( 0.097) 
TREAT*POST*HIGH_IACOUNT  δ6 -1.064 -1.95 * (-0.128) -1.588 -2.69 *** (-0.182) 
         
Sum of coefficients         
       δ1 + δ4 + δ6                [χ2]                                    -0.664 [2.79] * (-0.080) -1.065 [6.02] *** (-0.122) 
      δ1 + δ4                  [χ2]    0.401 [0.94]  ( 0.048) 0.523 [1.24]  ( 0.060) 
         
Controls Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Industry Industry 
Pseudo R2 0.163 0.272 
Observations 2,046 2,046 
 
This table reports results of logistic regressions exploiting a 2004 NYSE rule change that required listed firms to maintain an IAF that interfaces with 
the AC. The sample consists of NYSE firms with at least one charter observation both before and after the rule change (‘NYSE sample’, as described 
in Panel A of Table 1). The dependent variable is RESTATEMENT. TREAT is equal to one for all observations for firms that made no mention of the 
IAF in their AC charter until after the rule change (compliers). TREAT is equal to zero for all observations for firms that mention the IAF in their AC 
charter in both pre- and post-periods (early adopters). All other observations are removed from the sample. POST is equal to one for observations in 
2004 and later. HIGH_IACOUNT is equal to one (zero) when IA_COUNT is above (below) the sample median. The intercepts and controls (following 
Equation (1)), while included in the regressions, are repressed for brevity. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. Industry is defined using 









Description of detailed AC charter data 
Factor Analysis of 51 individual IAF references in AC Charters 
      
 Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 
Factor Name MEET/REVIEW FINANCIAL AUDIT INDEP COMPLIANCE 
Eigenvalue 5.69 2.52 1.78 1.48 1.13 
Variance explained 0.34 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.07 
Cumulative var. explained 0.34 0.49 0.60 0.69 0.84 
      
Rotated Factor Pattern (correlations between variables and factors) 
Evaluate_IA (#28) 0.525 0.110 0.075 0.136 0.008 
Hire_Fire_CAE (#29) 0.432 0.018 0.104 0.099 0.151 
AC_Report_to_Board (#30) 0.333 0.260 -0.055 -0.099 -0.010 
Review_Indep (#31) -0.008 -0.087 -0.044 0.585 -0.062 
IA_Report_to_AC (#32) 0.155 0.026 -0.069 0.030 -0.084 
Review_IA_Authority (#33) -0.100 -0.088 -0.083 0.546 -0.078 
Review_Scope (#34) 0.513 0.004 0.057 0.349 0.126 
Review_Budget (#36) 0.580 0.105 -0.070 -0.027 0.098 
Review_Staff (#35) 0.600 0.079 0.074 0.003 0.126 
Audit_Restrictions (#38) 0.018 -0.032 0.609 0.035 0.082 
Audit_Coordination (#37) 0.181 0.131 -0.067 0.380 0.008 
Review_IACharter (#39) 0.045 0.020 0.105 0.147 -0.012 
Report_to_Mgmt (#50) 0.089 0.025 -0.092 0.007 -0.080 
Meet (#23) 0.797 0.031 0.183 0.299 0.018 
Meet_Private (#24) 0.788 0.048 0.162 0.301 0.009 
Open_Com (#25) 0.093 0.029 0.210 0.377 0.059 
Free_Access (#27) 0.024 0.213 0.080 -0.017 0.046 
Audit_Problems (#26) -0.010 0.100 0.743 -0.005 0.114 
Review_Findings (#1) 0.368 -0.079 0.212 0.345 0.124 
Review_Responses (#3) 0.381 -0.045 0.335 0.084 0.176 
Internal_Control (#2) 0.186 0.056 0.048 0.485 0.139 
Fraud (#12) 0.007 0.070 0.013 0.259 -0.011 
Compliance (#8) 0.217 0.034 -0.021 -0.076 0.660 
Risk (#6) 0.121 0.062 0.048 0.307 0.129 
Ethics (#7) 0.213 0.023 -0.057 -0.016 0.706 
      






Table 5, cont. 
Description of detailed AC charter data 
Factor Analysis of 51 individual IAF references in AC Charters 
      
 Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 
Factor Name MEET/REVIEW FINANCIAL AUDIT INDEP COMPLIANCE 
Eigenvalue 5.69 2.52 1.78 1.48 1.13 
Variance explained 0.34 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.07 
Cumulative var. explained 0.34 0.49 0.60 0.69 0.84 
      
      
Rotated Factor Pattern, cont. 
Accounting_Reporting (#4) 0.251 0.261 0.426 0.025 0.001 
Discuss_Anything (#5) 0.257 0.160 0.275 0.052 -0.139 
Accounting_staff (#20) -0.070 0.164 0.106 0.108 0.305 
Financials (#9) 0.015 0.667 0.148 0.060 0.017 
Judgments (#11) 0.087 0.345 0.441 0.067 0.011 
Perqs (#14) -0.052 0.130 0.048 0.178 0.161 
Alt_GAAP (#17) 0.096 0.664 0.015 0.052 0.053 
Related_Parties (#15) 0.044 0.380 -0.014 0.047 0.217 
Off_BS (#16) 0.054 0.727 0.036 0.092 0.049 
MDA (#13) 0.040 0.736 0.151 0.003 -0.004 
Disagreements (#10) 0.035 -0.036 0.563 0.009 -0.048 
Special_investigations (#19) 0.084 0.246 -0.103 0.035 0.087 
IT_Security (#18) -0.008 0.094 0.114 0.040 0.044 
Evaluate_Indep_Aud (#41) 0.392 0.139 -0.038 -0.076 0.212 
Indep_Aud_Findings (#42) -0.076 0.215 0.129 0.152 0.279 
Indep_Aud_Plan (#43) 0.097 0.220 0.061 -0.052 -0.030 
Reliance (#49) 0.180 0.157 -0.045 -0.125 -0.094 
Outsource (#48) 0.244 0.160 -0.059 -0.090 -0.076 
No_IA (#51) -0.104 0.039 -0.031 0.035 -0.032 
      
 
This table presents the results of a factor analysis of the 51 individual types of references to the IAF in the ‘detailed sample’ of AC charters from 2000 – 
2006 that were manually coded (see Panel B of Table 1). Of these 51 variables, 7 were excluded from this factor analysis and all further tests because of 
low variation (less than 1 percent). The numbers in parentheses to the right of variable names correspond to the numbers in Appendix B where somewhat 






Table 6  
The associations between IAF factor variables and RESTATEMENT  
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable =  RESTATEMENT RESTATEMENT 
Independent variable Coefficient z-stat  (Marg. Eff.) Coefficient z-stat  (Marg. Eff.) 
         
F1_MEET/REVIEW -0.238 -1.96 ** (-0.029) -0.036 -0.25  ( -0.004) 
F2_FINANCIAL       -0.203 -1.58  (-0.025) -0.273 -1.36  (-0.033) 
F3_AUDIT  -0.075 -0.56  (-0.009) -0.097 -0.44  (-0.012) 
F4_INDEP  0.029 0.21  ( 0.004) 0.178 0.91  ( 0.021) 
F5_COMPLIANCE 0.296 1.91 * ( 0.036) 0.164 0.89  ( 0.020) 
         
OPEN_COM     0.025 0.09  ( 0.003) 
         
F1_MEET/REVIEW * OPEN_COM     -0.655 -2.46 ** (-0.079) 
F2_FINANCIAL * OPEN_COM     0.130 0.50  ( 0.016) 
F3_AUDIT * OPEN_COM     -0.027 -0.10  (-0.003) 
F4_INDEP * OPEN_COM     -0.355 -1.22  (-0.043) 
F5_COMPLIANCE * OPEN_COM     0.292 1.05  ( 0.035) 
         
Controls Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Industry, Year Industry, Year 
Pseudo R2 0.217 0.228 
Observations 1,088 1,088 
 
This table reports results from logistic regressions relating the probability of restatement to IAF monitoring variables based on the  ‘detailed 
sample’ of AC charters from 2000-2006 that were manually coded  (see Panel B of Table 1). The dependent variable is RESTATEMENT and 
the test variables include the IAF factors described in Table 5. OPEN_COM is equal to one if the AC charter includes the duty to maintain 
free and open communications among the AC, the IAF, and the external auditor. See Appendix A for all variable definitions. The intercepts 
and controls (following Equation (1)), while included in the regressions, are repressed for brevity. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 
and 99. Industry is defined using 2-digit SIC. z-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote 







The moderating effects of IAF independence 
  
Dependent variable =  RESTATEMENT 
  
Independent variable Coefficient z-stat  (Marg. Eff.) 
     
F1_MEET/REVIEW -0.333 -2.63 *** (-0.040) 
F2_FINANCIAL       -0.276 -1.65 * (-0.033) 
F3_AUDIT  -0.071 -0.54  (-0.009) 
F4_INDEP -0.091 -0.61  (-0.011) 
F5_COMPLIANCE 0.219 1.38  ( 0.027) 
     
F1_MEET/REVIEW * F4_INDEP -0.307 -2.12 ** (-0.037) 
F2_FINANCIAL * F4_INDEP 0.248 1.36  ( 0.030) 
F3_AUDIT * F4_INDEP -0.023 -0.17  (-0.003) 
F5_COMPLIANCE * F4_INDEP -0.079 -0.43  (-0.010) 
     
Controls Yes 
Fixed Effects Industry, Year 
Pseudo R2 0.223 
Observations 1,088 
 
This table reports results from logistic regressions relating the probability of restatement to IAF monitoring variables based on the  
‘detailed sample’ of AC charters from 2000-2006 that were manually coded  (see Panel B of Table 1). The dependent variable is 
RESTATEMENT and the test variables include the IAF factors described in Table 5. See Appendix A for all variable definitions. The 
intercepts and controls (following Equation (1)), while included in the regressions, are repressed for brevity. Continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1 and 99. Industry is defined using 2-digit SIC. z-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, 


















The moderating effects of AC ‘busyness’ 
  
Dependent variable =  RESTATEMENT 
  
Independent variable Coefficient z-stat  (Marg. Eff.) 
     
F1_MEET/REVIEW 0.351 1.37  ( 0.042) 
F2_FINANCIAL       0.224 0.63  ( 0.027) 
F3_AUDIT  -0.521 -1.12  (-0.063) 
F4_INDEP 0.048 0.16  ( 0.006) 
F5_COMPLIANCE -0.031 -0.07  (-0.004) 
     
BUSY_AC 0.412 1.24  ( 0.050) 
     
F1_MEET/REVIEW * BUSY_AC -0.697 -2.58 *** (-0.084) 
F2_FINANCIAL * BUSY_AC -0.448 -1.19  (-0.054) 
F3_AUDIT * BUSY_AC 0.464 0.95  ( 0.056) 
F4_INDEP * BUSY_AC 0.370 0.81  ( 0.045) 
F5_COMPLIANCE * BUSY_AC -0.031 -0.10  (-0.004) 
     
     
Controls Yes 
Fixed Effects Industry, Year 
Pseudo R2 0.227 
Observations 1,088 
 
This table reports results from logistic regressions relating the probability of restatement to IAF monitoring variables based on the  
‘detailed sample’ of AC charters from 2000-2006 that were manually coded  (see Panel B of Table 1). The dependent variable is 
RESTATEMENT and the test variables include the IAF factors described in Table 5. BUSY_AC is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the average number of board positions held by AC members is greater than or equal to two. See Appendix A for all variable definitions. 
The intercepts and controls (following Equation (1)), while included in the regressions, are repressed for brevity. Continuous variables 
are winsorized at 1 and 99. Industry is defined using 2-digit SIC. z-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, 






The association between IAF variables and loan spreads 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent variable = INTEREST  INTEREST  INTEREST 
IAF variable = IA_INDICATOR  HIGH_IACOUNT  LOG_IACOUNT 
 Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat  
IAF Variable -30.714 -3.17 ***  -13.065 -2.80 ***  -7.155 -1.75 * 
SIZE -5.468 -2.28 **  -6.084 -2.58 ***  -4.559 -1.92 * 
FIRMAGE -0.449 -2.58 ***  -0.483 -2.75 ***  -0.500 -2.89 *** 
ROA -232.399 -5.86 ***  -225.401 -5.68 ***  -251.389 -5.92 *** 
RATING 2.587 4.62 ***  2.718 4.82 ***  2.791 4.79 *** 
INTANGIBILITY 19.504 1.24   14.751 0.91   34.106 2.09 ** 
LEVERAGE 117.896 7.14 ***  115.911 6.90 ***  106.381 6.36 *** 
MTB -1.154 -0.46   -1.468 -0.58   -0.637 -0.23  
MATURITY 1.174 9.82 ***  1.157 9.69 ***  1.174 9.85 *** 
LOAN_SIZE -27.280 -9.65 ***  -27.530 -9.76 ***  -28.690 -10.01 *** 
NUM_LENDER -1.151 -2.96 ***  -1.151 -2.87 ***  -1.303 -4.24 *** 
            
Fixed Effects Industry, Year  Industry, Year  Industry, Year 
Adjusted R2 0.48  0.48  0.49 
Observations 3,017  3,017  2,734 
 
This table reports results from OLS regressions relating interest spreads in private loan agreements (from 2001 to 2007) to IAF monitoring variables 
based on AC charters from 2000-2006. The sample consists of all loan facility observations in DealScan that can be matched to a charter observation 
available as of the fiscal year ended prior to loan origination. The dependent variable is INTEREST and the test variable is one of IA_INDICATOR, 
HIGH_IACOUNT, and LOG_IACOUNT (following Equation (4)). In column 3, the sample is restricted to loan facilities for which IA_INDICATOR 
= 1. See Appendix A for all variable definitions. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. Industry is defined using 2-digit SIC. t-statistics 
are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. 







Loan spreads around the 2004 NYSE rule change 
 (1)  (2) 
Dependent variable =  INTEREST  INTEREST 
Sample: Unbalanced  Entropy-balanced 
 Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat  
        
TREAT α1 87.866 1.75 *  59.639 2.48 ** 
POST α2 -21.161 -2.78 ***  -2.626 -0.27  
TREAT * POST α3 -108.707 -2.13 **  -73.481 -1.77 * 
        
Sum of coefficients        
α1 + α3         [F-stat] -20.841 [2.68]   -13.842 [0.32]  
        
Controls Yes  Yes 
Fixed Effects Industry  Industry 
Adjusted R2 0.491  0.671 
Observations 1,210  1,210 
 
This table reports results of OLS tests exploiting a 2004 NYSE rule change that required listed firms to maintain an IAF that 
interfaces with the AC. The sample consists of all loan facility observations between 2001 and 2007 for NYSE firms with at 
least one charter observation both before and after the rule change. The dependent variable is INTEREST. TREAT is equal to 
one for all observations for firms that made no mention of the IAF in their AC charter until after the rule change (compliers). 
TREAT is equal to zero for all observations for firms that mention the IAF in their AC charter in both pre- and post-periods 
(early adopters). All other observations are removed from the sample. POST is equal to one for observations in 2004 and later. 
The intercepts and controls (following Equation (4)), while included in the regressions, are repressed for brevity. Continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1 and 99. Industry is defined using 2-digit SIC. t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered 
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